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Best Interests Of The Child:
By Whose Definition?
Harvey R. Sorkow*
As one gains exposure to the law, knowledge of the law, and expe-
rience with the law, a realization is obtained that for all its genius
and majesty, it insists on diminishing itself by the use of concepts dif-
ficult to define or to interpret, and sometimes to apply.
Finite clarity escapes. The word or phrase being used is found, af-
ter examination and analysis, to be an amorphous form. It is, there-
fore, suggested that the practice of law for all of its stare decisis is
still the practice of an art and not a science.
There is little that is absolute about rules, regulations, precedents,
or statutes so that in final analysis they require subjective application
to the fact circumstances under review. Of course, there are patterns
discernable from groups of decisions that can lead to a reasonable an-
ticipation of a result. It is submitted, however, that in a fact-inten-
sive circumstance under judicial scrutiny, similar results by different
judges is problematic.
Early in our study of the law, we encounter a foundational phrase:
the "reasonable man" (our now non-sexist society reads the "reason-
able person"). A judge, several judges, or a jury, wherever found, can
be expected to reach different results at different times on what that
phantom of the law should or should not have done at a certain time
and place. Yes there is anticipation, but of the probable, not the
absolute.
Rules of evidence are another area of the law submitted herewith
to prove the premise. It is rhetorically asked, "At what point does
'prima facie' evidence become evidence that is 'clear and convinc-
ing'?" It is further questioned whether this evidence can grow to a
"preponderance" or to the absolute "beyond a reasonable doubt".
Next we explore a phrase that any practitioner of family law-
* Former Presiding Judge, Bergin County Family Part Chancery Division, Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey. LL.B., Rutgers University School of Law, 1953.
from law clerk to counsel to court--speaks of, writes about, attempts
to define, and ultimately applies to a set of facts. The phrase to be
examined, dissected, and defined is "the best interest of the child."
Historically Justice Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for the New York
Court of Appeals in Finlay v. Finlay,' quoted an 1847 English Chan-
cery case saying "The Chancellor interferes for the protection of in-
fants."2 Justice Cardozo further emphasized that "such interference
is no concern for the disputants but for the child only."3
The concept of the child's "best interest" evolved over hundreds of
years. Early on, from Roman times through and into the nineteenth
century, English, American, and other common law jurisdictions
maintained the view that there was a paternal preference in child
placement. Indeed, the father was provider and head of the family.
Moreover, he alone could determine the child's religion and educa-
tion. At common law, the father's residence was the child's resi-
dence. Only extraordinary unfitness would deprive the father of his
custodial right.4
In the nineteenth century, as society found the mother at home
nurturing and caring for the child and the father out of the house for
long hours each day, courts began to grant the mother custody of the
child, recognizing her primary role as wife and mother. This was es-
pecially true if the child was young.
It is noteworthy that even though the court was found to interfere
for the child's welfare, what it was really doing was substituting ma-
ternal custody for paternal custody. This result may be historically
interesting, however, it fails to tell us what circumstances define a
child's "best interest."
What are the elements of "best interest"? A leading New Jersey
case 5 held that the court must explore factors relevant to a child's
"safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare. ' 6 However, it
is submitted that more is required. In particular, the New Jersey
trial court in In re Baby M. mentioned several definitions of the sub-
ject phrase. 7
In Baby M., experts called by the mother said, among other things,
that "the best interest is the best placement."8 But that language ap-
1. Finlay v. Finlay 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (quoting In re
Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 938 (1847)).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 938.
4. Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850, 851 (1821).
5. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 122 A.2d 593 (1956).
6. Id. at 536, 122 A.2d at 598.
7. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), cff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). For examples of 'test interest" see
iqfra notes 8-17.
8. Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. at 391, 525 A.2d at 1167.
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pears conclusory and without factual basis. Another of the mother's
experts suggested "best interest" was that which "is most suitable for
a child's proper growth [and] development with a minimum amount
of disability."9 This is seemingly more appropriate. One of the fa-
ther's experts suggested the standard required was "[a] psychological
milieu and environment best conducive to healthy normal relation-
ships."'1 Finally, the guardian ad litem's experts in Baby M. defined
"best interest" as that which consists of two basic needs: "A closeness
to be loved and to iove-to feel nurtured and a sense of oneness with
the opportunity to be separate-to develop one's own ideas and feel-
ings, to be independent." 11
The court in Baby M., however, determined the "best interest of
the child" by utilizing the combination of factors suggested by one of
the father's experts.12 Serially, the factors used by the court can be
universally applied in defining what is the best interest of a child.
First, examine each parent to determine whether the child is truly
wanted.' 3 Then explore the emotional stability of each applicant. 14
For example, is there a stability found in the household?15 Next, de-
termine the ability of the subject adults to recognize, respond, and
satisfy the child's physical and emotional needs. 16 Can one or the
other subordinate themselves for the benefit of the child? Finally,
inquire into the family's views on education and religion.17 How sin-
cere are the responses? Are there credible facts to support the
answers?
It is also necessary to investigate outside the household, in order to
get a total picture of "best interest." Significant questions include:
What relationship exists between a parent and his or her siblings?
What is the employment status and stability of each parent? Has the
working parent stayed with the same employer for a substantial pe-
riod? In consideration of these questions, one may have to look at
the geographical area's demographics and economy.
Looking again at the applicants seeking child custody, and trying to
9. Id.
10. Id, This author questions whether this rationale retires to square one, wherein
the father would have exclusive right to child custody.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 13-17.
13. Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. at 362, 525 A.2d at 1151.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id,
17. Id at 363, 525 A.2d at 1152.
define "best interest," one must additionally review the finances of
the parties and their respective motives for seeking custody. In de-
termining motive, consideration must be given to whether the prayer
for custody was in the complaint or counter-claim, and whether the
claim made was for tactical or positional purposes, so as to affect the
economic bargaining usually attendant to a child-related parental
dispute.
If a child is of sufficient age to be a reliable reporter, one should
favorably consider having the child speak to the judge who could
then hopefully gain a definition of the psychological relationship be-
tween the child and parents.
Noteworthy is the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 402
(UMDA).18 Section 402 of the UMDA provides that:
The Court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of
the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child. 19
Thirty seven states, including California, 20 have adopted legislative
criteria.21
Beyond the acts of the legislatures, our courts have generated a
number of criteria to use in seeking the elusive "best interest." In
the Alabama case of Ex parte Devine,22 the sex and age of the chil-
dren were factors employed in defining "best interest."23 In addition,
the following guidelines were utilized:
1) emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs;
2) the respective home environments offered by the parties;
3) the characteristics of those seeking custody, including age,
character, stability, mental and physical health;
4) the capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the
emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the
children;
18. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1982).
19. Id.
20. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4600.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
21. Freed and Foster, Family Law in The Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q.
289, 350 (1983). Other states, such as New Jersey, have chosen not to adopt legislative
criteria and instead rely on judicial precedent.
22. Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981). See also In re Marriage of Keating,
689 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1984).
23. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 696.
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5) the interpersonal relationship between each child and each
parent;
6) the interpersonal relationship between the children;
7) the effect on the child of disrupting or continuing an existing
custodial status;
8) the preference of each child, if the child is of sufficient age
and maturity;
9) the report and recommendation of any expert witnesses or
other independent investigator;
10) available alternatives; and
11) any other relevant matter the evidence may disclose.24
In applying all of the many aforestated criteria, the family law
practitioner has the opportunity to genuinely help a child. Care must
be taken not to subordinate the client's interest. If a conflict between
a parent and the child becomes apparent, counsel should petition the
court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Indeed, a guardian
ad litem should be mandatory in every contest where child custody is
involved.
Parental equality is the prevailing norm today. That is, each par-
ent comes into court with equal rights to the child.25 It is this issue
that has espoused the concept of "least detrimental alternative."26
"Least detrimental alternative" is used by the courts when both par-
ents are virtually equal as determined by "best interest" factors ap-
plied, but one or the other is genuinely bonded to the child. Other
limiting "but for" factors might be that the child is so young as to re-
quire neo-natal nurturing, that there is evidence of some measure of
unfitness in a parent, or that day to day care and activities are solely
one parent's function.
From a judge's concerned position, only the passage of time and the
development of the child will determine if the trial judge was correct
in defining "best interest of the child."
24. Id. at 696-97.
25. Although each parent maintains equal rights to the child, in actuality, it is pos-
sible that neither parent may be best suited for the child.
26. G. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD (2d ed. 1979).

